Introduction as to Why General Sherman was a War Criminal
Other than my posts on why we remember Lee. the Memoirs of Ulysses Grant, and the book Lee’s Lieutenants by Douglas Southall Freeman, I’ve stayed away from writing about the civil war. However, as a Georgian, I feel it is my duty to write about why General Sherman was a war criminal. He burned my state and killed my fellow Georgians. So, please read this essay I wrote for a politics class on why General Sherman is a war criminal. He burned, raped, and pillaged his way across the Deep South!
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My Essay on Why General Sherman was a War Criminal:
General Sherman’s March to the Sea was a militarily effective operation, the first part of which, the capture of Atlanta, was also militarily necessary for a Union victory. However, the destructive way in which General Sherman’s troops prosecuted the campaign led to lasting resentment in the South that was directed towards the Union and made Lincoln’s goal of a post-war, national reconciliation impossible in the short term because of the fact that General Sherman was a war criminal.
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The initial phase of Sherman’s March to the Sea, his campaign from eastern Tennessee to Atlanta, was entirely of a military nature and was militarily necessary for Union victory in the Civil War. Furthermore, recognizing that the operation should be of a military nature, General Grant instructed Sherman to inflict damage on Southern “war resources,” not civilian infrastructure. General Sherman was a war criminal, but that was not because of General Grant’s orders.
During this first phase of his campaign, Sherman focused on Atlanta because the city of Atlanta was not only a “vital business center, rail hub, and symbol of the South” but also one of the larger urban areas in the South. In addition to the capture of the city itself, the first half of Sherman’s march was effective because Union troops were able to do great damage to the Confederacy’s key railroad lines of supply, such as the Georgia Railroad.
Sherman’s advance to Atlanta was supposed to complement Grant’s attack into Virginia and was part of the military strategy developed jointly by Generals Grant and Sherman in 1864. They planned on using the Union’s manpower, industrial, and naval advantages to launch simultaneous attacks into Virginia and Georgia to overwhelm the two Confederate armies.
“Lincoln and Grant combined the separate elements of Union power in a complementary way to make continuing the war more painful to the Confederate population than rejoining the Union.” When Ulysses Grant’s campaign in Virginia had stalled, Sherman needed to succeed to help the Union gain a decisive victory against the Confederacy in 1864. Therefore, President Lincoln supported Sherman’s thrust into Georgia because he saw it as militarily supporting Grant’s advance into Virginia.
While he advanced to Atlanta, General Sherman fought The Army of Tennessee. It was one of two major armies with which Union forces had to contend in 1864. As such, destroying it, or at least preventing it from uniting with General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, was a key piece of Union strategy. By dividing the Confederate armies, Union forces could take full advantage of their overwhelming manpower advantage. That goal, supported by Lincoln, was completed when General Hood and the remainder of the Army of Tennessee retreated to Northern Alabama and General Sherman captured Atlanta.
The Battle of Atlanta occurred because capturing the city and destroying the army defending it was a valid military objective. However, Sherman based the second part of his action, the “March to the Sea,” not on military necessity, but rather “to bring the war home to the Deep South.” While he burned his way through Georgia, his opponent, General Hood, had retreated to Northern Alabama. Had Sherman kept military objectives in mind, he would have instead sought to pursue and destroy Hood’s Army of Tennessee. But, of course, because General Sherman was a war criminal, he didn’t do that.
Instead, he marched through Georgia to Savannah, then marched up the coast and into South Carolina, the state most destroyed by his March. Moreover, while planning his punitive campaign through the Deep South, “[Sherman] did not expect serious military opposition.” When Grant and Sherman conceived of their dual attacks into Virginia and Georgia, both were focused on destroying Confederate Armies. However, on his own initiative, Sherman “changed the basis of Union strategy,” which, up until he captured Atlanta, had been to militarily defeat the South, and instead focused on “carrying the war to the Confederacy’s civilians” rather than achieving military objectives. That portion of his campaign was characterized by destruction of property, rather than only occupation [Georgia].”
By 1864, it was increasingly obvious to the generals involved that victory by fighting alone was near impossible; “Civil War commanders therefore faced almost continual pressure, from Bull Run until the end of the war, to seek battle as a means to destroy opposing armies, despite mounting evidence of the near impossibility of a Napoleonic battle of annihilation.”
Sherman’s strategy shifted from seeking out enemy armies to one of demoralization through breaking the will of the civilian population. Sherman “intended to demoralize his opposition… by burning, destroying, and laying waste.” That policy began during his time in Mississippi and continued until General Johnston’s surrender in April of 1865. Or, in other words, General Sherman was a war criminal that shifted from attacking the opposing army to attacking Confederate civilians.
Despite the second phase of Sherman’s campaign not being militarily necessary, it was militarily effective and “played a significant role in the Union victory.” Therefore, Sherman’s campaign through the Deep South, premised around his strategy of “breaking the will of the Confederate people by every means except slaughtering them wholesale,” was militarily successful in that it brought about a collapse of Confederate soldiers’ morale and eroded their ability to make war because many farms, factories, and railroads were destroyed. However, the tactics used were not militarily necessary and went against the rules of war at the time, showing that General Sherman was a war criminal.
To determine whether those actions were atrocities, it is first necessary to understand the rules of war at the time of Sherman’s campaign. Many of those rules came from conventions in European warfare: “by the eighteenth century, in spite of widespread warfare, Europeans and some other groups across the globe seemed to be in the process of limiting the scope and cruelty of wars.”
Although wars in Europe were brutal, their violence was largely directed at soldiers rather than civilians. That was an important distinction and was a rule of war that Confederate civilians would likely have expected because by the time of the civil war, “civilians, in particular women and children, became more protected. If… violence still occurred in early-nineteenth-century Western armies, perpetrators of such crimes might well find themselves facing a firing squad or a noose courtesy of their own army. Cities were indeed bombarded, but usually with a warning and often only after the evacuation of non-combatants.” The Civil War was different because during Sherman’s march, there was an “increasing willingness to do violence to civilians.”
However, because they desired both an immediate return of Confederate civilians to obedience to the Constitution and post-war reconciliation, Lincoln and his cabinet tried to limit the violence done to Confederate civilians and the amount of damage done to Confederate civilian property. General Sherman was a war criminal, but Lincoln and his cabinet weren’t.
For example, Lincoln supported the creation code of military conduct under General Orders 100, which were “guidelines [that] set out rules with the aim of delimiting some of the chaos and violence of war.” More specifically, General Field Order no. 100 forbid attacks on unarmed civilians and said that private property should be spared. In any case, the rules of war were generally unwritten at that time. Although “the March meant abandoning some unstated rules of war”, Southerners had no legal grounds to contest Sherman’s actions, despite the fact that General Sherman was a war criminal.
Despite perhaps not being illegal, Sherman’s actions in both Atlanta and the Deep South’s countryside were seen as violations of the conventional rules of war by Confederates.
While Atlanta was a valid military objective, it was the scene of atrocities by Union troops. One aspect of the Battle of Atlanta that was seen as a violation of the laws of war was “the bombardment of the civilian population.” Union shelling of Atlanta, rather than Confederate defenses, killed civilians, including a young girl.
Confederate civilians were angry and resentful that they, non-combatants, were the victims of an intentional artillery bombardment because that was seen as against the rules of war. Confederate civilians also characterized Sherman’s expulsion of them from Atlanta as an atrocity. That expulsion was done not out of military necessity, but to teach the populace to fear him.
Even he recognized that his actions would lead to Southerners viewing him as acting with “barbarity and cruelty.” The third atrocity Sherman was accused of after taking Atlanta was burning the city after General Hood abandoned it. According to some historians, Sherman was the one that ordered Atlanta be burned, but he only ordered that property of military value be destroyed.
Others, mainly those that don’t say that General Sherman was a war criminal, say that General Hood started the fire. However, while General Hood and his Confederate troops destroyed eighty-one railcars with supplies, they did not burn the city. Although the fire was likely the result of both Confederate and Union actions, Atlantans generally blamed Sherman for it, leading to post-war resentment; their perceptions, rather than the facts of the matter, were what mattered most after the event itself.
During the Battle of Atlanta, General Sherman insisted that his actions were predicated on military and political necessity. Destroying the Confederate Army of Tennessee, which defended Atlanta, and capturing a major Confederate city before the 1864 election were important goals at the start of the campaign and Sherman’s success was made even more crucial by General Grant’s failures to advance in Virginia.
After capturing Atlanta, “Sherman embarked on his campaign to make ‘Georgia howl'” and he is estimated to have destroyed about $300 million in property during his march. The tactics Sherman used, such as the destruction of houses and farms, burning of crops, and confiscation or killing of livestock were not improvised as the march progressed. Rather, he had honed them during his time in Mississippi and Memphis. Throughout the Civil War, Sherman “intended to demoralize his opposition… by burning, destroying, and laying waste.” That policy began during his time in Mississippi and continued until General Johnston’s surrender.
While marching through Georgia and South Carolina, Sherman’s troops appropriated “everything not nailed down” and “there was a massive amount of wanton destruction” that left the civilian population “at a subsistence level.”
That destruction mainly consisted of thoroughly ransacking and burning homes along Sherman’s route of advance. Some areas of Georgia, such as Sandersville, remained in a state of economic hardship for years afterwards because of the destruction Union troops were able to inflict on them. Also, there were not only cases of Union troops carrying off food or horses, but shooting animals and burning farm implements simply so that Southern civilians could not later use them.
When pillaging Confederate homes, many Union soldiers engaged in disputes with Confederate civilians that created personal battles between Yankees and Southerners, thus making the war more personal. Even worse for southern traditionalists, many of the conflicts created were between Yankee men and Southern women, so “gender norms turned typically overlooked acts into unpardonable insults.” The Southern conception of honor and gender norms was shaken by those insults, with many Southern men perceiving their families’ honor as being violated by those interaction and insults.
Sherman’s campaign built lasting resentment in the South because of the indignities his atrocities visited upon their families; returning Confederate soldiers were more likely to be angry about how he acted towards their families and property than how they personally were treated by him. In other words, after having their homes broken into and pillaged by Union soldiers, many Southern civilians “viewed the war and the Confederate cause through the prism of the Union’s dishonorable behavior.” Sherman and his men “left bitterness, hatred, and Confederate patriotism in their wake,” especially among the women whose homes were destroyed by Union troops.
In the words of one woman, “‘if they were gentlemen we could bear it better.”‘ Because women were the ones most affected by Sherman’s march, they were the ones who remained the most embittered about the indignities they suffered at Sherman’s hands; “white Southern women’s persistent belief in the Confederacy and continued hatred of the enemy stemmed from their experiences as civilian targets during Sherman’s march.” As with the conclusion of the Battle of Atlanta, perceptions of those incidents created a hatred of Lincoln and the Union that was not easily extinguished after the war ended.
While the level of destruction inflicted by Sherman’s soldiers was, at times, severe in Georgia, it was milder than in South Carolina, on which most of Sherman’s destruction centered. Whereas they had spared houses in Georgia, in South Carolina they destroyed everything they came across. That level of destruction even extended to the entire city of Columbia, which Union troops burned to the ground.
Cases of Union troops attacking and burning civilian property without reason increased, rather than decreased, as Union troops advanced deeper into Georgia and South Carolina and away from any major Confederate units. Sherman’s wholesale destruction of civilian areas, despite a lack of serious opposition, shows that the second phase of his campaign was about punishing civilians rather than acting out of military necessity.
Sherman’s utter destruction of South Carolina and less complete, but still brutal punishment of southern and coastal Georgia was due to his desire to punish the inhabitants of the Deep South for being the principal supporters of secession.
After the conclusion the war, Southerners were angry and bitter. There were many aspects of Southern reluctance to reconcile after the war. Reconstruction, former slaves now being freemen, and corruption of Union officials were some of those factors, as was Southern resentment of Sherman’s actions.
Some of the South’s anger was due more to the freedom of blacks than the destruction wrought by the war. However, many accounts that stress anger at the new freedoms enjoyed by blacks are from areas like Richmond that were not destroyed by Sherman. While Reconstruction and the abolition of slavery were significant factors in post-war Southern anger, they were only the main factors in areas of the South that did not experience Sherman’s March. In those areas that did, such as southern Georgia and South Carolina, perceived Union atrocities and attacks on Southern honor were the larger issues.
Additionally, there is little evidence that the post-war anger in the South was caused by the battles themselves. For example, even Southern veterans from Sherman’s campaign to take Atlanta were able to reconcile with Union troops they fought against; General Howard (Union) and General Stephen Lee (confederate), two opposing commanders from the Battle of Ezra Church battle, were former West Point classmates and were eventually able to reconcile after the war. Similarly, there were many examples of captured Confederate officers and soldiers getting along with their Union captors. Even battles that took place during Sherman’s campaign did not breed as much deep-rooted animosity as his later burning of the Deep South.
Therefore, post-war Southern resentment was not concentrated among former Confederate soldiers, who harbored little animosity for their Union adversaries. Instead, that resentment was concentrated in civilians of the Deep South that experienced the destruction and violation of norms perpetrated by Sherman’s troops.
A considerable measure of bitterness towards the Union in the post-war Deep South stemmed from Sherman’s campaign of destruction. Many white Southerners “nursed a dark, abiding hatred of the North” that only began to heal in the 1960s and ’70s. The needlessness of Northern destruction was the most particular cause of anger over the fact that General Sherman was a war criminal.
Southerners could understand Union troops carrying off food or stealing horses but shooting animals and burning farm implements simply so Southerner farmers could not later use them was viewed with disgust and produced lasting anger, which is recorded in the diaries and letters of women who experienced the destruction of their property. That needless destruction also included the destruction of private property such as pianos and diaries, the pointless destruction of which led to lasting resentment because Southerners recognized that General Sherman was a war criminal.
Whatever state they took place in, Sherman’s atrocities “left a legacy of hunger, homelessness, and discomfort” and “engendered considerable anger.” Afflicted areas’ inability to recover due to his actions also produced lasting resentment. The anger caused by Sherman’s campaign of destruction was so pervasive that families told stories of it for decades afterward in letters, novels such as Gone with the Wind, and when telling anecdotal stories of the war.
The result of the hatred Sherman engendered among the Deep South’s civilian population was that “when Southerners remembered Sherman after the war, they remembered not just destruction, but humiliation.” Not only was there humiliation in the minds of Southerners, but also in the South’s post-war landscape. Entire communities remained devastated due to a lack of capital to rebuild, which was also humiliating, so Sherman was particularly the one blamed for post-war misery in areas that he had devastated, such as Georgia.
Finally, Sherman understood when embarking on his march that it would mean “abandoning some unstated rules of war.” Because of that, Southerners after the war “accused him of violating the rules of civilized conflict” and they “never forgave him” for doing so. As a result, the South’s “view of Sherman as a barbarian has been the most enduring one.” Whether that view is right or wrong is not as important as that many Southerners held it immediately after the war. It was at least partially responsible for their reticence to make peace with the Union because they felt they had been treated unjustly.
Evidence of the South’s lasting resentment surfaced in literature, both fiction and non-fiction. For example, Jefferson Davis’s Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government reserves special disgust for Sherman, especially his burning of Columbia, SC; Davis published it in 1881, but the memory was still anger-inducing, showing how perceptions of Sherman’s actions contributed to hatred towards him.
Also, novels about the “Lost Cause” and antebellum culture for years after the war were full of tales of destruction during Sherman’s March; Gone with the Wind is one example. Whether or not the stories were true is not as important as that they show the resentment and rejection of reconciliation that followed Sherman’s March.
The other significant way by which citizens of the Deep South showed their resentment of Sherman’s March was how they reacted to Lincoln’s assassination. In areas burned by Sherman’s troops, such as Columbia, Southerners were more likely to react to Lincoln’s assassination with joy than mourning. Conversely, areas of the South not destroyed by Sherman were not as joyous, and some even mourned his passing.
Those who cheered Lincoln’s death were largely non-combatants who had experienced Sherman’s March to the Sea, which further shows how Southern civilians were more resentful after the war than Confederate soldiers.
Lincoln, who was supportive of a conciliatory post-war policy, was not well-liked in the South. However, some Southerners did understand that his post-war policies would be better for the South than the Reconstruction plans of the radical Republicans. The joyous response to his death in the Deep South in comparison to the muted response in areas of the South not targeted by Sherman, shows how those who were terrorized by Sherman were embittered and willing to resist the Union rather than work with relatively moderate members of the Union government.
Although not overly involved in Union War strategy, Lincoln did work with his generals and cabinet to create a strategy that would work quickly and not leave the South embittered. Lincoln’s main contributions to implementing a winning strategy were entrusting Grant to devise strategy and continually calling for more troops.
Other than those roles, Lincoln tended to defer to General Grant on strategy and execution of that strategy. However, he did recognize that the success of both Sherman and Grant’s mutually supportive campaigns in 1864 were crucial for his reelection, so he closely watched the Battle of Atlanta.
Despite his moderate involvement with strategy, Lincoln did try to shift strategy to fit his views of the South’s mindset. Originally, Lincoln, Grant, and others in the North assumed that the Confederates might have some “inclination towards unionism and restoration” and they hoped to capitalize on that to coax Southerners back to the Union.
As such, their war plan was not particularly punitive. However, hopes for Southern Unionism were dashed by the time of the Battle of Shiloh in April of 1862, the ferocity of which convinced Lincoln and Grant that the war needed to be waged with more vigor. That epiphany might have been why Lincoln was subsequently willing to allow Sherman’s campaign even though it would engender bitterness.
Even while supporting Sherman’s campaign, Lincoln leaned toward policies that would promote reconciliation. For example, in a preliminary draft of the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln proposed compensating the Confederate states for freed slaves if they surrendered immediately.
That policy would have been beneficial because it would have given former Confederates capital with which to rebuild their communities. Also, after union troops recaptured Southern states, Lincoln advocated the policy of reinstalling “the usual political mechanisms in the rebel states” to create a quick reconciliation. However, it was Congress that wasn’t supportive of that policy and instead pushed for an intensive reconstruction.
Further evidence of Lincoln’s policy of reconciliation was his “Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction,” which would have allowed states to rejoin the Union after “10 percent of the 1860 voting population had taken an oath of loyalty.” He hoped that policy would allow for a speedy reconstruction process. He hoped that policy would allow for a speedy reconstruction process and support his goal of “a reconstruction based on carrots rather than sticks.”
Also, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address highlighted that policy of reconciliation. In it, two phrases show his desire to reconcile with the South. The first is when, while describing the North and South, he says that “both read the same Bible and pray to the same God.”
Lincoln highlighted the North’s similarity to the South and in doing so attempted to bridge the sectarian divide with a religious commonality.
The second phrase from his Second Inaugural Address that highlighted his policy of reconciliation is “with malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds…to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.” Whether that statement was taken at face value or not by the South is not as important as that he said it to the whole nation during his address. Again, General Sherman was a war criminal, but Lincoln wasn’t.
By stating it openly, Lincoln showed that his post-war plans involved national reconciliation. Through healing the hatred caused by the war, Lincoln hoped to create lasting peace. However, Southern anger was based on perception of Union actions, not Union intentions, and there is little evidence, other than the occasional mourning for his death, that Southerners perceived his goodwill.
A third example of Lincoln’s policy of reconciliation was the surrender policy he instructed General Sherman to follow. When Lincoln met with Sherman in North Carolina, he implored Sherman to convince Johnston to surrender without shedding any more blood. Also, the terms surrendering Confederates were offered were quite generous because of Lincoln’s policy of “malice towards none and charity for all.” Even General Sherman offered generous terms of surrender, such as a promise of amnesty for surrendering Confederates.
In the words of Admiral Porter, on whose vessel Lincoln, Sherman, and Grant discussed surrender terms to offer the Confederate armies, “Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with the most liberal views toward the rebels. He felt confident that we would be successful and was willing that the enemy should capitulate on the most favorable terms” and “his heart was tenderness throughout.” In other words, Lincoln was willing to behave generously towards the South as a way of furthering reconciliation because “reuniting the nation [was] his primary concern and objective.”
President Lincoln and Generals Sherman and Grant embraced a “hard war-soft peace” philosophy by the end of the war, with General Sherman being its principal proponent; given that General Sherman was a war criminal, it makes sense that he supported such brutal policy. They expected that by prosecuting the war quickly and with all available vigor, it could be ended before bitterness set in. That philosophy was first tested when Johnston and Sherman met to discuss peace terms. Although they were able to remain cordial, other Southerners who had experienced the destruction caused by Sherman’s march were not able to do so.
Wade Hampton, for example, who had witnessed the burning of Columbia, “[threatened] retaliation for Federal harshness.” So, despite Sherman’s predictions, “war’s end would not necessarily end war bitterness.” That remaining bitterness was due to Sherman’s harshness towards Southern non-combatants while on the march.
Then, “during the postwar era, the most important national objective was to reconcile the two sections of the country after 4 years of destruction.” However, that reconciliation was difficult, if not impossible, in the Deep South due to the legacy of devastation in the Deep South caused by Sherman. Too much of the Deep South had been left destroyed and unable to recover and too many civilians, especially women, had been left embittered by their treatment at the hands of General Sherman’s troops.
By: Gen Z Conservative
Brands, H. W. 2009. “Dark Night of the Soul.” American History 44 (4): 44–49. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=109354218&site=ehost-live.
Brands, H. W. 2009. “Man of War or Man of Peace?” American History 44 (5): 58–63. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=109354406&site=ehost-live.
Caudill, Edward, and Paul Ashdown. Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
Ecelbarger, Gary L. The day Dixie Died: The Battle of Atlanta. New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2010.
Erath, John. 2015. “Union Success in the Civil War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders.” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, no. 77 (2015 2nd Quarter): 128–36. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=102583711&site=ehost-live.
Frank, Lisa Tendrich. The Civilian War : Confederate Women and Union Soldiers During Sherman’s March Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015.
Georgia Historical Quarterly 100 (3): 260–89. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=119493972&site=ehost-live.
Guelzo, Allen C. Abraham Lincoln : Redeemer President Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999.
Hess, Earl J. The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta. Chapel Hill, [North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015.
Hodes, Martha Elizabeth. Mourning Lincoln New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.
Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.: for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1989; Bartleby.com, 2001. www.bartleby.com/124/. .
Marszalek, John F. Sherman : A Soldier’s Passion for Order New York: Free Press, 1993.
Murray, Williamson, and Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh. A Savage War : a Military History of the Civil War Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
Rubin, Anne S. Through the Heart of Dixie Sherman’s March and American Memory Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014.
Wortman, Marc. The Bonfire The Siege and Burning of Atlanta. Public Affairs, 2010
 Ecelbarger, The Day Dixie Died, 9
 Ibid, 70.
 Wortman, The Bonfire,207.
 Erath, “Union Success in the Civil War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders,”128.
 Wortman, The Bonfire, 239.
 Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln, 385.
 Wortman, The Bonfire, 206.
 Ibid, 207.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage,446.
 Ibid, 538.
 Ibid, 447.
 Ibid, 430.
 Erath, “Union Success in the Civil War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders,” 130.
 Marszalek, Sherman, 235.
 Ibid, 315.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage War, 484.
 Tooley “‘All the People Are Now Guerillas,’” 356.
 Ibid, 357.
 Caudill and Ashdown. Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory,75.
 Ibid, 2.
 Hess, The Battle of Ezra Church, 4.
 Ecelbarger, The Day Dixie Died, 29.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage War,444.
 Ibid, 443.
 Rubin, Through the Heart of Dixie,10.
 Lowe, “Lincoln, the Fall of Atlanta, and the 1864 Presidential Election,” 227.
 Wortman, The Bonfire, 206.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage,450.
 Rubin, Through the Heart of Dixie,145.
 Tooley, “‘All the People Are Now,’” 363.
 Marszalek, Sherman, 235.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage War, 467.
 Rubin, Through the Heart of Dixie, 15.
 Ibid, 51.
 Frank, The Civilian War, 3.
 Ibid, 6.
 Hodes, “Mourning Lincoln,” 158.
 Frank, The Civilian War, 2.
 Ibid, 16.
 Ibid, 139.
 Ibid, 146.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage War, 481
 Ibid, 483.
 Ibid, 478.
 Caudill and Ashdown, Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory,52.
 Hodes, Mourning Lincoln, 33.
 Hess, The Battle of Ezra Church, 204.
 Marszalek, Sherman, 302.
 Frank, The Civilian War, 129.
 Murray and Hsieh, A Savage War, 508.
 Rubin, Through the Heart of Dixie,51.
 Frank, The Civilian War, 7.
 Ibid, 4.
 Ibid, 145.
 Ibid, 47.
 Caudill and Ashdown, Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory, 2.
 Ibid, 3.
 Ibid, 26.
 Rubin, Through the Heart of Dixie, 127.
 Ibid, 204.
 Brands, “Dark Night of the Soul,” 63.
 Frank, The Civilian War, 142.
 Wortman, The Bonfire, 208.
 Ibid, 7.
 Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln, 335.
 Ibid, 339.
 Ibid, 389.
 Ibid, 391.
 Ibid, 392.
 Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, speech, Washington, March 4. 1865.
 Brands, “Dark Night of the Soul,” 63.
 Marszalek, Sherman, 337.
 Hodes, Mourning Lincoln, 158.
 Rubin, Through the Heart of Dixie, 41.
 Marszalek, Sherman, 337.
 Ibid, 343.
 Erath, “Union Success in the Civil War and Lessons for Strategic Leaders,” 134.